What's Happening with the Uyghurs?

Sibi

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The world knows what's happening to the Uyghurs / Uighurs. Almost all global clothing brands are implicated in the use of cotton sourced from Xinjiang. The Chinese government forcibly relocates Uyghur men and women away from their homes and existing jobs to cotton fields. Here, they are paid at most 15 cents a day to pick cotton, with most paid nothing at all. They were placed in "re-education" camps in an attempt to strip away their language, culture, and hope. China tortures, sterilizes, forces abortions, rapes, and kills. They take their children away into "orphanages." Some countries have condemned China and some have supported them, even deporting their Uyghurs. Saudi Arabia has even deported Uyghurs on Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca).

Recent History
  • In July 2009, riots broke out in Xinjiang in response to a violent dispute between Uyghur and Han Chinese workers in a factory and they resulted in over 100 deaths. Following the riots, Uyghur radicals killed dozens of Chinese citizens in coordinated attacks from 2009 to 2016. These included the August 2009 syringe attacks the 2011 bomb-and-knife attack in Hotan, the March 2014 knife attack in the Kunming railway station, the April 2014 bomb-and-knife attack in the Ürümqi railway station, and the May 2014 car-and-bomb attack in an Ürümqi street market.
  • Several of the attacks were orchestrated by the Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement) which has been designated a terrorist organization by several countries including Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (until 2020), in addition to the United Nations.
  • 2014 - China's "Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism" used a tactic in Maoist strategy - the people's war - against the Uyghurs. They hired more police officers by the thousands.
  • 2015 China said a third of Xinjiang's Uyghurs were "polluted by religious extremist forces," and needed to be "educated and reformed through concentrated force."
  • 2015 Chinese state-security was developing a "Integrated Joint Operations Platform" (IJOP) to analyze information from its surveillance data. According to an analysis of this software by Human Rights Watch, a member of a minority group might be assessed by the IJOP as falling under one of 36 "person types" that could lead to arrest and internment in a re-education camp. Some of these person types included:
    • people who do not use a mobile phone,
    • who use the back door instead of the front,
    • who consume an "unusual" amount of electricity,
    • have an "abnormal" beard,
    • socialize too little,
    • maintain "complex" relationships,
    • have a family member that exhibits some of these traits and so is "insufficiently loyal"
  • There is also a list of the 75 traits that religious extremists exhibit
  • In April 2021, the Chinese government released 5 propaganda videos titled, "Xinjiang is a Wonderful Land", and released a musical titled "The Wings of Songs" which portrayed Xinjiang as harmonious and peaceful. The Wings of Songs portrays "a rural idyll of ethnic cohesion devoid of repression, mass surveillance" and without Islam.
  • In 2017 John Sudworth is a British journalist that was previously the Beijing correspondent for the BBC. Sudworth and his camera crew were attacked and forced to sign a confession in a Chinese village. He left Beijing and moved to Taipei with his wife and three young children in March 2021
  • In 2017 Uygurs and other Turkic Muslims were forced into the Xinjiang internment camps officially called vocational education and training centers by the government of China.
  • In 2019 it was estimated that 1.5 million people, mostly Uyghurs but also including Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other ethnic Turkic Muslims, Christians, as well as some foreign citizens including Kazakhstanis, were placed in these secretive internment camps located throughout the region.
  • In June 2021 - Uyghurs are being deported from Muslim countries.
Quotes
  • ....party theorists began to call for implementing a more monocultural society with a single “state-race” which would allow China to become “a new type of superpower....
  • ....The papers also show how Beijing is pioneering a new form of social control using data and artificial intelligence. Drawing on data collected by mass surveillance technology, computers issued the names of tens of thousands of people for interrogation or detention in just one week. ....
  • ....Former inmates say that they are required to learn to sing the national anthem of China and communist songs. Punishments, like being placed in handcuffs for hours, waterboarding, or being strapped to "tiger chair" (a metal contraption) for long periods of time, are allegedly used on those who fail to follow....

Testimonies
Mihrigul Tursun, an Uyghur woman:
Tursun said she and other inmates were forced to take unknown medication, including pills that made them faint and a white liquid that caused bleeding in some women and loss of menstruation in others. Tursun said nine women from her cell died during her three months there. One day, Tursun recalled, she was led into a room and placed in a high chair, and her legs and arms were locked in place. "The authorities put a helmet-like thing on my head, and each time I was electrocuted, my whole body would shake violently and I would feel the pain in my veins," Tursun said in a statement read by a translator. "I don't remember the rest. White foam came out of my mouth, and I began to lose consciousness," Tursun said. "The last word I heard them saying is that you being an Uyghur is a crime." Later on Mihrigul finds she has been forcibly sterilized.​
Gulnar Omirzakh, a Chinese-born Kazakh,
When she had her third child, the government ordered her to get an IUD inserted. Two years later, in January 2018, four officials in military camouflage came knocking at her door anyway. They gave Omirzakh, the penniless wife of a detained vegetable trader, three days to pay a $2,685 fine for having more than two children.​
Erzhan Qurban, an ethnic Kazakh
He was grabbed by police on a trip back to China to see his mother and accused of committing crimes abroad. He protested but, his time in Kazakhstan was reason enough for detention. He was locked in a cell with 10 others last year and told not to engage in “religious activities” like praying. They were forced to sit on plastic stools in rigid postures for hours at a time. Talk was forbidden, and two guards kept watch 24 hours a day. Inspectors checked that nails were short and faces trimmed of mustaches and beards, traditionally worn by pious Muslims. Those who disobeyed were forced to squat or spend 24 hours in solitary confinement in a frigid room. “It wasn’t education, it was just punishment,” said Qurban, who was held for nine months. “I was treated like an animal.”​

Mamattursun Omar, a Uighur chef
He was arrested after working in Egypt, was interrogated in four detention facilities over nine months in 2017. He was asked to to verify the identities of other Uighurs in Egypt. Eventually, Omar says, they began torturing him to make him confess that Uighur students had gone to Egypt to take part in jihad. They strapped him to a contraption called a “tiger chair,” shocked him with electric batons, beat him with pipes and whipped him with computer cords. “I couldn’t take it anymore,” Omar said. “I just told them what they wanted me to say.”​

Sayragul Sauytbay, a Communist Party member
She was abducted by police in November 2017 and forced to become a Mandarin camp instructor. “In every corner in every place there were armed police.” Sauytbay called the detention center a “concentration camp ... much more horrifying than prison,” with r*pe, brainwashing and torture in a “black room” where people screamed. She and another former prisoner, Zumrat Dawut, also told the ICIJ detainees were given medication that made them listless and obedient, and every move was surveilled.​

Anar Sabit,
Before and after her internment, Sabit said that she experienced what Chinese sometimes call gui da qiang, or 'ghost walls' "that confuse and entrap travelers"​

Gulbakhar Jalilova, an ethnic Uyghur from Kazakhstan.
Jalilova said she confronted one guard who sexually assaulted her. "I told him, 'Aren't you ashamed? Don't you have a mother, a sister, how can you do this to me like that?' He hit me with the electroshock prod and said, 'You don't look like a human'," she said.​



Uyghur birthrate


Publicly Announces Support for China's Treatment of the Uyghurs
China Thanks 36 Countries, Half of Them Islamic States, for Praising Its Uighur Policies
Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, DR Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Kuwait, Laos, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, UAE, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
  1. Egypt -has also deported Uyghurs to China.
  2. Saudi Arabia - detained Uyghurs on hajj and deported them to China. In February 2019, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman defended China's use of the camps, saying "China has the right to carry out anti-terrorism and de-extremisation work for its national security." Saudi Arabia was among the 24 countries (excluding China) that backed China's position at the UN Human Rights Council in July 2019, and again at the UN General Assembly in October 2020
  3. Iran - Iran signed an October 2019 letter that publicly expressed support for China's treatment of Uyghurs.
  4. Belarus - On 5 March 2021, a group of 65 member states—led by Belarus—expressed their support of China's Xinjiang policy and opposed the "unfounded allegations against China based on disinformation" at the 44th session of Human Rights Council.
  5. Cuba - On 6 October 2020, Cuba delivered a joint statement with 45 other countries voicing their support of China’s measures in Xinjiang.
  6. Indonesia - Indonesia's largest Muslim organizations have purportedly treated reports of widespread human rights violations in Xinjiang with skepticism, dismissing them as U.S. propaganda
  7. Pakistan - signed both statements at the UN (in July and October 2019) that supported China's Xinjiang policies
  8. Palestine - Abbas voiced support for China's "legitimate position on Hong Kong, Xinjiang and other matters concerning China's core interests.
  9. Syria - December 2019, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates defended China's actions in Xinjiang days after the US condemnation, stating that it is a "blatant interference by the US in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of China."
  10. Turkey -In July 2019, Chinese state media reported that when Turkish President Erdoğan visited China, he said, "It is a fact that the people of all ethnicities in Xinjiang are leading a happy life amid China's development and prosperity." Turkish officials then claimed the paraphrase was mistranslated by the Turkish side, saying it should rather have read "hopes the peoples of China's Xinjiang live happily in peace and prosperity". Erdoğan also said that some people were seeking to "abuse" the Xinjiang crisis to jeopardize the "Turkish–Chinese relationship". Some Uyghurs in Turkey have expressed concerns that they may face deportation back to China.
  11. The UN Response 2019 UN counter-terrorism chief Vladimir Voronkov visited Xinjiang and found nothing incriminating at the camps.

Uyghurs are being deported from Muslim countries, raising concerns about China's growing reach
Even in Muslim countries that have traditionally been seen as places of safety for Uyghur Muslims, the sand is shifting.​
Over the last decade, thousands of Uyghurs have settled in Turkey, with Uyghur neighborhoods and schools cropping up in the country's major cities.​
In addition to sharing a religion with the majority of Turkey's population, Uyghurs — a Turkic ethnic group — also speak a similar language.​
But in recent years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan -- who once championed Uyghur rights — has toned down his criticism of China's Xinjiang policy, in an apparent bid to boost relations with Beijing.​

Malaysia Actively Trying to Save Uyghurs
In September 2020, Malaysia’s new government decided not to extradite ethnic Uyghurs to China if Beijing requests it. Despite the government of Malaysia's stance not to get involved in Chinese internal affairs, it has stated that Uyghurs are being oppressed in the country. Mohd Redzuan Md Yusof, minister in the Prime Minister’s Department also stated that his government would provide free passage to those refugees who would want to settle in a third country
United States -
House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy - “The ‘Woke’ party would rather keep turning a blind eye than stand against human rights abuses."​
The Democrats support China. Don't forget Rep Swalwell dated a Chinese spy (and farted on TV), Diane Feinstein had a Chinese spy chauffeur for 20 years!
Biden's stance:​
“We must speak up for human rights. It’s who we are,” Biden began, before discussing his call with Xi. “I said, look — Chinese leaders, if you know anything about Chinese history, it has always been the time when China has been victimized by the outer world is when they haven’t been unified at home. So the central, to vastly overstate it, the central principle of Xi Jingping is that there must be a united, tightly controlled China. And he uses his rationale for the things he does based on that,” Biden added. He then laid out what American “norms” and culture demanded of an American leader. “I point out to him: No American president can be sustained as a president if he doesn’t reflect the values of the United States. And so the idea that I’m not going to speak out against what he’s doing in Hong Kong, what he’s doing with the Uighurs … and Taiwan, trying to end the One-China policy … by the way, he said he gets it,” Biden said. “Culturally, there are different norms that each country and their leaders are expected to follow,” Biden added.
John Kerry the climate "Czar" - member of Skull and Crossbones along with George Bush.​
“Clearly a priority of the Biden administration is really addressing climate, but it’s not the only priority,” Bloomberg's Westin noted in the interview. “There are other things as well, such as the Uyghur situation in the west. What is the process by which one trades off climate against human rights?” “Well, life is always full of tough choices in the relationship between nations,” Kerry responded.​
Kerry’s brushing aside of human rights in China echoes previous comments he made during an April interview, in which he suggested the U.S. should push aside “differences on human rights” in order to pursue cooperation with China on climate change.​



Articles
The errr... expert on the Uyghurs.


Basketball player Enes Kanter Freedom eviscerates China over treatment of Uyghurs; calls out Muslim leaders, athletes.




Resources
Uyghur Human Rights Project How to Help - Contact congress, Stop forced labor, Sign a petition
End Uyghur Forced Labor
Stop Forced Labor Fashion
Save the Uighurs - 10 Things You Can Do Today

These companies committed to the Call to Action to act responsibly and prevent their supply chains being linked to the forced labour of Uyghurs and other Turkic and Muslim-majority peoples.
  • ASOS plc
  • EILEEN FISHER
  • Marks and Spencer Group plc
  • OVS S.p.A
  • Reformation
  • TFG Limited (Hobbs, Phase Eight, Whistles)
  • WE Fashion


Brands The Use Uyghur Slave Labor

  • L BRANDS (Victoria Secret +) June 21: Wall Street Journal article reports: “L Brands […] said on its website earlier this year that it was committed to eliminating forced labor, including in Xinjiang. Its website has since deleted the reference to Xinjiang.”
  • INDITEX (Zara, Massimo Dutti +) March 25, 2021: Inditex takes down forced labour statement.
  • PVH (Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger +) March 25, 2021: PVH takes down Xinjiang statement.
  • HUGO BOSS March 28, 2021: Hugo Boss tells Bloomberg that social media post promoting Xinjiang cotton was “unauthorized” and has now been deleted.
  • VF (Northface, Vans +) March 25, 2021: Takes down Xinjiang statement. March 27, 2021: Uploads a new diluted version of Xinjiang statement. Mentions of “forced labour” have been scrubbed in this new statement. April 1, 2021: VF clarifies in a letter that, despite having taken down its Xinjiang statement out of an “abundance of caution,” at no point did the company change any policy or practice with regard to sourcing products from the Uyghur Region.
  • Kelme March 25, 2021: Promotes use of Xinjiang cotton.
  • OFILM’s website indicates the Xinjiang workers make screens, camera cover lenses and fingerprint scanners. It touts customers including Apple, Samsung, Lenovo, Dell, HP, LG and Huawei, although there was no way for the AP to track specific products to specific companies.

Retailers
Amazon private labels
Burlington Stores, Inc. (Burlington)
Costco
Kohl’s
Macy’s Inc. (Macy’s)
Muji
Nordstrom
Ross Stores, Inc.
Sears Holdings (Sears)
Target Corporation (Target)
Tesco plc (Tesco)
TJX Companies Inc. (TJ Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods, HomeSense
Walmart Inc. (Walmart, Sam’s Club, Flipkart, Bonobos)
Walt Disney
Wesfarmers (Kmart Australia, Target Australia)
Woolworths
Technology
Acer
Apple
ASUS
Dell
HP
Lenovo
LG
Huawei
Cisco
Electrolux
Microsoft
OFILM
Oppo
Samsung
Sony
Xiaomi

Automobile
BMW
General Motors
Jaguar
Land Rover
Mercedes-Benz
Mitsubishi
SAIC Motors
Volkswagen
Clothing & Shoe Brands
Abercrombie & Fitch (Hollister Co., Ruehl No. 925)
Adidas
American Eagle Outfitters, Inc.
Anta Sports Products Ltd.
Apparel Group Ltd. (licensed apparel for NFL, NBA, MLB, NHL)
Burberry Group PLC
Capri Holdings Ltd. (Michael Kors, Versace, Jimmy Choo)
CHANEL
Esprit
Fast Retailing (Uniqlo, Theory, Helmut Lang, J Brand, Comptoir des Cotonniers, GU, Princesse Tam-Tam)
FILA
Foot Locker
Gap Inc. (Old Navy, Banana Republic, Athleta)
Guess
Hanesbrands Inc. (Hanes, Champion, Playtex)

Hermès International S.A.
HLA Corporation Ltd.
Inditex (Zara, Massimo Dutti, Berska, Oysho, Pull and Bear, Stradivarius, Uterque, Stradivarius, Lefties)
J Sainsbury plc (Sainsbury’s)
Japan Display Inc.
Kering (Gucci, Balenciaga, Yves Saint Laurent, Bottega Veneta, Alexander McQueen, Brioni)
Kontoor Brands (Lee, Wrangler, Rock & Republic)
L Brands (Victoria’s Secret, Bath and Body Works, La Senza)
L.L.Bean
Lacoste
Levi Strauss & Co. & Dockers
Li-Ning Mayor
Lululemon Athletica
LVMH (Louis Vuitton, Dior, Fendi, Givenchy, Celine, Sephora)

Next plc
Nike, Inc. (Nike, Brand Jordan, Converse)
Nordstrom, Inc. & Nordstrom Rack
PVH (Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger, Heritage Brands portfolio)
Ralph Lauren Corporation & Club Monaco
Richemont Group (Chloé, dunhill, Peter Millar)
Tapestry (Coach, Kate Spade, & Stuart Weitzman)
VF Corporation (The North Face, Timberland, Dickies, Vans, Jansport)
 
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Apheirox

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China is a major world issue - one not easily dealt with. We can help by boycotting Chinese products.

 

Sibi

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Articles

Chinese Propaganda Articles
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM -Belgian Atomium is illuminated in the colors of Uyghur flag. Pillar of Shame replica for Uyghur protest in Italy.

A Uyghur protestor's mask.


About that Pillar of Shame...
Tiananmen massacre 'Pillar of Shame' monument removed in Hong Kong December 24, 2021




Propaganda




"We're Free and Happy"
 

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Sibi

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The Colorful Propaganda in Xinjiang

The murals below were painted on the walls next to a mosque in the old Silk Road district of Kashgar where 90% of the population are Uighur.


The government says some Uighurs are being radicalised by jihadist videos made in Pakistan and Afghanistan and accessed via the internet. Here, veiled Uighur women are downloading and sharing banned material with Uighur men.


Banned material can also be picked up by private satellite receivers, which are cheap in China but illegal without a permit.


In some places, the government has banned women from wearing veils.


The government has doubled the policing budget in the province and jailed hundreds of Uighurs, but violent attacks have still continued. Here, a Chinese cement roller crushes knife-wielding Uighurs, again painted in black.


“A mountain of knives and a sea of fire” is a Chinese proverb that describes a difficult and dangerous situation. Many of the recent violent attacks in Xinjiang and beyond have involved knives. Uighurs are now banned from buying knives in some parts of Xinjiang.


Beijing says terrorists must be chased down like rats in the street.


A similar image shows an axe with the National Emblem of the People’s Republic of China crushing terrorists, again appearing in sinister black.


Armed security forces are a common sight on the streets of Xinjiang.
The armed guards in this picture are flanked by peaceful doves.


In front of a Chinese flag, Uighurs read a Chinese book. The government believes Uighurs should be Chinese first and Muslim second.


The government has banned anyone under the age of 18 from entering a mosque.


The government says Uighur children should attend school and not go to mosque. This will keep them away from evil jihad as represented by the sinister Uighur in the left of this mural.


The picture on the left shows an imam marrying a Uighur couple in secret. This is against Chinese law.


The government has started a campaign called “Project Beauty”. Only older Uighur men are allowed to have beards while Uighur women are banned from wearing full veils.


The Chinese government says it wants a harmonious society represented here by a woman in traditional Han – the ethnic majority in China – dress dancing happily with a Uighur woman.
 

Sibi

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Beautifying Spaces: 美丽家庭 (Měilì jiātíng)
The “Beautifying Spaces” campaign, which commenced in 2018, is intended to transform the “backward production and lifestyles” (落后的生产生活方式) of almost 400,000 families living in 22 counties throughout Xinjiang. The project emphasizes redesigning domestic arrangements, implementing the “toilet revolution,” and beautifying neighborhood courtyards
Beauty Project: 靓丽工程 (Liànglì gōngchéng)
it called on women from all of Xinjiang’s ethnic groups to support the region’s jewelry, clothing, and cosmetics industries and to start their own businesses. And second, it sought to bring these women in line with “modern culture” through education, propaganda, mobilization, and public activities that emphasized physical and “spiritual” beauty. Ended June 25, 2016.
Becoming Family campaign: 访惠聚 (Fǎng huì jù)
The implementation of this campaign involves rotating 200,000 mid-level party cadres into rural villages over the three years starting in 2014. While this campaign ostensibly mirrors the mass line of the Mao era, these visits are primarily for surveillance and to monitor potential religious or “extremist” behaviors in the domestic realm.
Bianminka: 便民卡 (Biànmín kǎ)
The Bianmin Card, literally “the convenient for the people” card, is an “internal passport” that residents of Xinjiang must carry if they are living away or traveling to other parts of the region. Obsolete now due to advances in surveillance.
Bilingual Education: 双语教育 (shuāngyǔ jiàoyù)
One of the official aims of “bilingual” education is for non-Han students to become fluent in Chinese and strengthen their national identity towards the Chinese Nation (中华民族).
Comrade: 同志 (Tóng zhì)
A term Han cadres used to refer to one another in the Mao era meaning comrade (literally “same will/aspiration”). While this term has fallen out of favor in contemporary discourse and has been largely claimed by the LGBTQ community to refer to each other, it is still ubiquitous in official CCP usage. In the Becoming Family Campaign, the comrades (those with the same aspiration) are on a shared mission to “become families” with the subjects under surveillance.
Confidence Doctrine/The Four Confidences: 四个自信 (Sì gè zìxìn)
The Confidence Doctrine (literally the Four Confidences) is an expansion of the previous Three Confidences under Hu Jintao. Confidence in the chosen path of Chinese Socialism, political system, and guiding theories were already in place before the addition of a new confidence in China’s culture. This new confidence in China’s culture is significant because it is added to the country’s constitution. Just what is included in China’s culture are not explicitly defined.
Convenience Police Station: 便民警务站 (Biànmín jǐngwùzhàn)
Convenience police stations are concrete, bulletproof installations that house medical equipment, charging stations for mobile phones, umbrellas and other “convenient” community services.
Detention center or jail: 看守所 (Kānshǒusuǒ)
Kanshousuo functions as an interrogation center where detainees are held until they are sent either to prison or camps. They are not considered prisons. In American counterterrorism, similar spaces are often referred to as “black sites” since they are where most of the torture takes place. In Xinjiang, they are some of the most crowded and inhumane spaces in the reeducation system.
De-extremification campaign: 去极端化 (Qù jíduān huà)
The ideological campaign of re-education is referred to as “de-extremification”, a term first used by the former XUAR Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian at a 2011 Communist Party meeting in Hotan. This campaign permeates every aspect of life in Xinjiang from schools to the workplace in order to curb any signs of “extremist” activities. It has since evolved to extend to all mediascapes and aspects of communal life such as public slogans, TV performances, and sketch comedies.
Ethnic Unity: 民族团结 (Mínzú tuánjié)
Ethnic unity in the official discourse in Xinjiang is the so-called “common unity” and “ethnic solidarity” where the emphasis is placed on “Xinjiang (as) an inalienable part of the motherland.” In the official wording of the Ordinance on Education for Ethnic Unity in Xinjiang: “The carrying out of ethnic unity education is a common responsibility of society as a whole. Acceptance of ethnic unity education is a right to be enjoyed and an obligation to be fulfilled by citizens according to law.”
Four Activities: 四项活动 (Sì xiàng huódòng)
This term is the CCP’s categorization of a set of religious and cultural practices that, according to Timothy Grose, “provide opportunities for devout and casually religious families alike to strengthen connections.” These activities include baby-namings, circumcisions, funerals, and weddings. In order to “standardize” religious affairs and bolster the “fighting strength, team spirit, and cohesion” of the Party branch, authorities have launched a set of policies known as the four applications, four delegations, and four receipts. In practice, this means that any family wishing to hold a baby-naming event, circumcision, funeral, or wedding will need to fill out an application, host a CPP representative, and produce a receipt documenting the event.

Four Consciousnesses: 四个意识 (Sì gè yìshí)
The Four Consciousness is a term introduced by Xi Jinping during the 2016 Politburo spelling out the political consciousness (政治意識), big-picture awareness(大局意識), leadership-core values (核心意識) and alignment in ideology (看齊意識) for party members. It marks a further shift towards authoritarianism and power centralization compared to the Hu Jintao’s “Three Supremes” and Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents.” In the context of Xinjiang, the guidance of the Four Consciousnesses means that any signs of dissent will not be tolerated and a heavy-handed practice is justified. For example, the mass construction of re-education camps under the current Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo reflects the further shift towards authoritarianism guided by these principles.

Four Togethers and Four Gifts: 四同四送 (Sì tóng sì song)
The “Four Togethers” and “Four Gifts” are a set of guidelines that inform the mass work performed by cadres throughout Xinjiang. They are generally carried out in tandem with other campaigns, such as fanghuiju (访惠聚). The “Four Togethers” include eating together, living together, working together, and learning together, and the “Four Gifts” are policy, law, warmth, and civilization. Government briefs typically characterize these policies as a mutually beneficial process in which cadres learn about rural life and gain skills while villagers learn about state policy. They also appear frequently in government reports promoting the state’s efforts to alleviate poverty and promote national unity.

Grid-style Social Management: 网格化管理 (Wǎng gé huà guǎnlǐ)
Grid street layout has a long history for social control and military purpose since Imperial China. Grid-style social management, or grid management system was first raised at the 18th Party’s Congress as a social management mechanism that focuses on systematic digitization of the management subject, process, and evaluation. This system divides urban communities into geometric zones to facilitate police activity, technologically automated surveillance and Artificial Intelligence analysis. Since 2017, Party Secretary Chen Quanguo applied the Grid Management System Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Integrated Joint Operation Platform: 一体化联合作战平台 (Yītǐ huà liánhé zuòzhàn píngtái)
IJOP gathers information from multiple sources or “sensors.” for example, CCTV cameras, wifi sniffers, security checkpoints and from “visitors’ management systems” in access-controlled communities. The IJOP also draws on existing information, such as one’s vehicle ownership, health, family planning, banking, and legal records, according to official reports. Police and local officials are also required to submit to IJOP information on any activity they deem “unusual” and anything “related to stability” they have spotted during home visits and policing.

Neighbourhood policing personnel: 社区 (Shèqū)
While the term shequ originally means community, it is the local apparatus of the party bureaucracy in this context where services and monitoring coexist. Through red-tape and bureaucratization, the state is able to render subjugation banal and ordinary. These public spaces are important in people’s daily life and also for the state’s effective surveillance and monitoring of any unwanted behaviors and speech.

Pan-halalization: 泛清真化 (Fàn qīngzhēn huà)
“Pan-halalization” is the term used by the CCP to describe the labeling of non-food items such as toothpaste, soap, paper, and other products as halal. In a piece published by the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Food and Drug Administration titled “The Essence of ‘Pan-halalization’ is Religious Extremist Thinking,” Tsinghua PhD student Tursun Ebey contends that deradicalization and depan-halalization go hand in hand in the CCP’s efforts to promote long-term peace and security in the region. In addition to monetary interests, the piece suggests, extremist influences have encouraged pan-halalization to bypass state deradicalization efforts and promote a version of Islam not sanctioned by the state. Authorities also worry that pan-halalization sows division and encourages Uyghurs to avoid Han-run stores. State efforts to combat pan-halalization have led to the confiscation of everyday items associated with Islam. According to a June 2017 report on an exhibit dedicated to the “Three Illegals and One Product” (三非一品), these objects include water jugs, culinary implements, religious texts, prayer rugs, “restricted knives” (管制刀具), and explosive materials.

Pomegranate Seeds: 石榴籽 (shíliúzǐ)
Pomegranate Seeds are the most recent metaphor for minzu unity in China. At a Xinjiang Work Forum held by the central governments in May 2014, Xi Jinping encouraged all minzu groups in China to nestle tightly together as if they were pomegranate seeds (read more here). Since then, the metaphor has spread to every corner of Xinjiang. This metaphor can be seen in newspapers, TV commercials, public posters, and statues on the streets, as part of the symbolic construction of all minzu in one family of the Chinese Nation (中华民族). Using metaphors, like this one, to propagate minzu unity has a long history in China. The initial metaphor was the Big Family (大家庭), which was created by the CCP in 1949. In 1989, Fei Xiaotong, a famous Chinese ethnologist, came up with the concept of the Big Garden (大花园) to describe cultural diversity and unity in China. Compared with the Big Garden metaphors, the Pomegranate Seeds heavily emphasizes minzu cohesion among different groups rather than diversity.

Poverty Alleviation: 扶贫 (Fúpín)
The CCP defines “Poverty Alleviation” as a socialist mission to eliminate poverty, improve the quality of the people’s livelihood, and become a “well off” (小康) society by 2020. In 2016, the State Council’s 13th Five-Year Plan issued guidelines for poverty alleviation through industrial development, labor training and transfer, relocation, and other means to target specific rural low-income households in western regions of China. In Xinjiang’s context, this agenda has led to coerced labor of Uyghur detainees to work in the auxiliary factories of the internment camps, and mass relocation to factories in Inner China.

Religious Extremism: 宗教极端主义 (Zōngjiào jíduān zhǔyì)
A Chinese Government White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang (June 2016) discusses religious extremism in the following terms “Affected by international religious extremism, religious extremism has grown and spread in Xinjiang in recent years. Religious extremism betrays and distorts religious doctrines, deludes and deceives the public, particularly young people, with their fallacies, and changes some people into extremists and terrorists completely under its control.”

The working definition of religious extremism is thus vague, murky, and open to the state’s interpretation. In effect, any religious activities that are not sanctioned by the government could be seen as being extremist and any mention of Xinjiang independence is decidedly viewed as extremist by the government.

Self-defence Self-governance: 群防群治 (Qúnfáng qúnzhì)
The Self-defence, Self-governance is an application of the Mass Line (群众路线) by the party in public security, which requires the governments to mobilize people to maintain social security and solve the conflicts at the grassroots level. It mainly includes two activities: resolving conflicts and doing security checks and patrols to prevent any illegal activities. Xi Jinping borrowed the idea from Mao’s “Fengqiao Experience” (枫桥经验), which refers to Public Security Committee (治安保卫委员会) established in the 1950s to oppress anti-revolutionaries, and required Xinjiang governments to practice it, during a meeting in March 2017. In Xinjiang, the best manifestation of the Self-defence, Self-governance is Ten Family Joint Defence (十户(铺)联防), also known as Double Family Defence Stability Maintenance (维稳双联户), which is the most pervasive security system in Xinjiang.

Social Harmony: 社会和谐 (Shèhuì héxié)
The use of social harmony in politics in China largely begins with Hu Jintao’s official policy to promote a “harmonious socialist society” that is characterized by socioeconomic development, ethnic harmony, and peaceful international relations. This social harmony in practice meant that undesirable public discourse is censored and social disturbances are suppressed. Prioritizing harmony means that dissent could be viewed as subversion of state power and could be subjected to harsh penalties.

Stability Maintenance: 维稳 (Wéiwěn)
Overall, weiwen gives expression to a range of policing methods aimed at preventing, controlling or punishing social dissent and social disorder, particularly petitioning (信访and 上访) and ‘mass incidents’ 群体性事件. it entails strong-arm coercive tactics aimed at the minority who are protest ringleaders and, secondly, it emphasises ‘persuasion and education’ for the vast majority of citizens.

“Strike Hard” campaign: 严打 (Yándǎ)
The national campaign against crime “Strike hard” was launched in April 1996. This campaign began shortly after a special meeting in March of 1996 on maintaining stability in Xinjiang, it was targeted at separatism and illegal religious activities. The Permanent Committee of the Politburo of the CCP then issued an exhaustive list of strict directives aimed at tightening control over Xinjiang and eradicating potentially subversive activities. As part of the same campaign, a succession of strong-arm police operations were mounted.

Targeted Population: 重点人口 (Zhòngdiǎn rénkǒu)
This term originally referred to various “undesirables” such as class enemies, counter-revolutionaries, and criminals in the Mao era and the 1980s. It has now expanded and evolved into denoting petty criminals, drug addicts, mental health patients, and in the context of Xinjiang, those who are suspected of being piously Muslim and/or not loyal to China. This labeling and clumping Muslims together with criminals entail state intervention and ubiquitous surveillance. Particularly, once labeled as a “Zhongdian Renkou,” people are monitored and restricted in every aspect of their lives from finding employment to being subjected to arbitrary home visits.

Ten Family Joint Defence: 十户(铺)联防 (Shíhù(pū) liánfáng)
The Ten Family Joint Defence (TFJD), also known as Double Family Defence Stability Maintenance (维稳双联户), is a security mechanism that puts every ten families/shops together as a security unit responsible for surveilling each other, doing security patrols, and checking within their territory. Guided by the Self-defence, Self-governance (群防群治), the TFJD aims to mobilize all residents to form an all-pervasive mechanism that maintains social stability. In Xinjiang, based on the principle of proximity, every ten families/shops have been organized to participate in security measures under a leader, named the Leader of Double Family or Ten Family (双联户长或十户长), who is responsible for reporting suspicious situations to the grid leader, Shequ, or public security bureau.

Three Forces: 三股势力 (Sāngǔ shìlì)
While the term has been part of Chinese security policy in Xinjiang for a long time—the party-state refers to terrorism, separatism and extremism as the “three evil forces,” with extremism becoming increasingly predominant in the official discourse. Further. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an “anti-terror” body consisting of China, Russia, and a few other Central Asian countries, has explicitly stated to target the Three Forces in the region.

The Three News Campaign: 三新活动 (Sān xīn huódòng)
The Three News Campaign was inspired by Xi Jinping’s announcement of the “Beautiful China” initiative during the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress on October 18, 2017. According to Timothy A. Grose, authorities in Xinjiang drew on the initiative in their formulation of plans to “beautify” Uyghur communities throughout the region. Because the “Three News” include “advocating a new lifestyle,” “establishing a new atmosphere,” and “constructing a new order,” the campaign does more than remodel homes and neighborhoods. Goals include eliminating certain religious practices, regulating clothing, and promoting community activities like sports and patriotic singing competitions. One government announcement describes the campaign as raising ideological awareness (思想觉悟), moral standards (道德水准), and civilized self-cultivation (文明素养).

Three types of people: 三类人员 (Sān lèi rényuán)
The “three types of people” are prisoners, inmates in detention centers, and inmates in re-education facilities. According to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (document in English and Chinese) the first category refers to people who have participated activity considered to be extremist but not a crime. The second category refers to people who have participated in an activity considered extremist and criminal, but is willing to acknowledge wrongdoing and be reintegrated back to society. The third category refers to people who have already been convicted or sentenced for behaviour considered extremist and criminal, but still remain a threat to society. While the approach to each type of detainees is slightly different, it reflects a systematic, centralized mode of institutionalization ever since the “Strike Hard Campaign” has gone into overdrive.

A secondary definition of the three types of people in official discourse is “extremists, separatists, and terrorists.” While the term is applied inconsistently by different government agencies, it is used to denote the “undesirables” worthy of detention and high-handed state intervention.

Transformation through Education: 教育转化 (Jiàoyù zhuǎnhuà)
Jiaoyu zhuanghua is the Party’s title for its “de-radicalization” work geared towards maintaining social stability or weiwen (维稳). Following a 2017 knife-attack near Hotan led by three Uyghur perpetrators, the XUAR Department of Justice issued a directive ordering the establishment of concentrated transformation centers (教育转化培训中心 or 教培中心) throughout Xinjiang focused on removing the ‘malignant tumour’ of religious extremism.

Two Pan-isms: 双泛主义 (Shuāng fàn zhǔyì)
This term refers to a pair of ideologies, “pan-Islamism” and “pan-Turkism,” which the CCP perceives as root causes of unrest in Xinjiang. Because these ideologies are premised on identification with religious and cultural groups beyond China’s borders, the state considers them a threat to nationalism, and by extension, a threat to long-term stability. In 2017, Zhang Kejan, the Executive Deputy Minister of Xinjiang’s Propaganda Department Party Committee, called for a concerted effort against the spread of the two pan-isms. For Zhang, combatting these ideologies means addressing the issue from multiple perspectives: from a historical perspective, by maintaining that the region has long been a part of China; from an ethnic perspective, by maintaining that Uyghurs have long been part of the “big Chinese ethnic family”; and from a cultural perspective, by maintaining that the region’s many cultures have long been a part of China’s culture.

Two Safeguards: 两个维护 (Liǎng gè wéihù)
Like the Confidence Doctrine and the Four Consciousnesses, the Two Safeguards are part and parcel of Xi Jinping’s centralization of power. “Defending the status of General Secretary Xi Jinping as the core of the CPC Central Committee and the whole Party and the authority and centralized and unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee” is the definition lifted from the “Regulation of the Communist Party of China on Development of Intra-Party Regulations (2019).” Since the regulation has been updated there has been a plethora of Chinese academic and official discourse published to justify and support this slogan. In conjunction with the Doctrine and the Consciousnesses, the Safeguards mark the new paradigm under Xi’s regime.

Two-faced people: 两面人 (Liǎngmiàn rén)
Originally a term used by Chinese Communist Party to rectify Party members who show disloyalty and are critical of the Party’s policies. Since 2017 in Xinjiang, the Party has waged a campaign to fight against “two-faced people” within the Party. The arrested and disappeared “two-faced people” are mostly Uyghur intellectuals, Party officials, and members, who allegedly “exhibited nationalist sentiment” and thus suspected of being an obstacle in the Party’s fight against terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.

Volunteering: 志愿 (Zhìyuàn)
Western Volunteer project (西部计划 xibu jihua) was initiated nationwide as early as 2003. In 2011, a special sub-project for Xinjiang was established. The project calls for Inner China college graduates to serve in rural Xinjiang in the fields of basic education, agricultural science, medicine, administrative management, and youth work. By 2016, 15,000 Inner China graduates have volunteered in Xinjiang and over one third have settled in Xinjiang permanently. This program has continued since the ‘People’s War on Terror’ campaign was launched in 2017, the Xinjiang government and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp have recruited thousands of graduates to come serve in Xinjiang every year, where they are expected to stay longer.

Vow of Loyalty (to the party): 发声亮剑 (Fāshēng liàngjiàn)
Fasheng liangjian means literally “to vocalize and to brandish swords,” which is a political confession ritual involving forced ‘vows of loyalty‘ to the party and authority. An example can be seen at the Changji People’s Procuratorate 2018 “Special Ethics Lecture,” where presenters vocalize party views on morality, the rule of law, religion, and other topics pertinent to a unified, stable China. This vow of loyalty is particularly applied in the context of Xinjiang to emphasize a performative avowal to adhere to the official discourse. Another example can be found in Hetian People’s Government site.

Xinjiang Aid: 对口援疆 (Duìkǒu yuán jiāng)
Duikou yuan jiang, or simply yuan jiang literally means “(Partner) Xinjiang Assistance/Aid,” is an official economic development policy in Xinjiang. The policy ostensibly brings economic development to Xinjiang through industrialization in manufacturing sectors, investment in agriculture, and vocational training. However, the Chinese state has made it clear that it is also to foster connections between Xinjiang and the rest of China and serve “counter-terror”and “national stability” goals. Since 2018, it has been documented that the many of the workers in these factories are involuntarily held there and have been transferred all across China to work in various sectors.

Source: https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/glossary/
 

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